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I. INTRODUCTION 
Each year banks and other lenders make numerous loans to 
borrowers based on ostensibly accurate information only to learn that 
much of the information is fraudulent.1  In fact, the breadth and depth 
of mortgage loan origination fraud has been immense.2  Between 2006 
and 2010, borrowers obtained more than $80 billion in mortgage loans 
by using fraudulent application data.3 Lenders who are fraudulently 
induced into making loans can seek relief under the Mandatory 
Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (MVRA).4  The MVRA governs 
federal criminal restitution and provides that in cases of crimes 
resulting in the loss of a victim’s property, restitution is mandatory.5 
In Robers v. United States,6 the Supreme Court will consider 
whether a defendant who has fraudulently obtained a loan, and thus 
owes restitution to the lender under the MVRA, returns any part of 
the loan money by giving the lenders the collateral securing the loan.7 
Petitioner Benjamin Robers asks the Court to hold that the return of 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2015, Duke University School of Law. I would like to thank Professor 
Elisabeth D. de Fontenay, Ravi Patel, Todd Noelle, and Brianna Strange for their assistance in 
connection with this note.  
 1.  See, e.g., FIN. CRIMES INTELLIGENCE UNIT, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 2010 
MORTGAGE FRAUD REPORT, at 4 (2011), available at http://www.fbi.gov/stats-
services/publications/mortgage-fraud-2010/mortgage-fraud-report-2010.  
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Id. 
   4.   See Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3663A (West 2014). 
 5.  18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3663A(a)(1), (b)(1) (West 2014). 
 6.  Robers v. United States, No. 12-9012  (U.S. argued Feb. 25, 2014).  
 7.  Brief for Petitioner at i, Robers v. United States, No. 12-9012 (U.S. Dec. 13, 2013).    
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houses that served as collateral for loans made to him constitutes a 
return of at least part of the loan money to those lenders.8 Both sides 
agree that under the MVRA, courts must reduce the restitution 
award by “the value . . . of any part of the property that is returned.”9 
But they disagree regarding the question of what constitutes “the 
property that is returned.”10 
Robers argues that “the property returned” is the value of the 
houses at the time of foreclosure because that is the time the 
properties are surrendered or returned to the lenders11—the collateral 
as returned property rule. On the other hand, the government argues 
that only the eventual cash proceeds obtained when the properties 
are resold count because cash—not collateral—is the property that 
was fraudulently obtained, and cash is what needs to be returned12—
the cash as returned property rule. Answering this question, the 
Seventh Circuit, siding with the government, held that the value of the 
property returned (that is, the defendant’s restitution obligation 
“offset value”) is the eventual cash proceeds from the resale of the 
property—the cash as returned property rule.13 
In Robers, the Supreme Court will ultimately decide what 
constitutes “the property that is returned” for purposes of calculating 
the defendant’s restitution offset value. Based on the MVRA’s plain 
meaning and its strong purpose to make the victim whole,14 the Court 
will likely conclude that “the property that is returned” for offset 
value purposes is the property originally fraudulently obtained, which 
in this case was cash—not the houses which served as collateral for 
the cash.  The property fraudulently obtained is only returned upon 
the recoupment of cash proceeds obtained when the collateral houses 
are resold. 
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
In 2004, Benjamin Robers participated in a mortgage-fraud 
scheme devised and carried out by several co-conspirators.15 The co-
 
 8.  Id. at 2. 
   9.  United States v. Robers, 698 F.3d 937, 939 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 
3663A(b)(1) (2006)), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 470 (Oct. 21, 2013). 
 10.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 11.  See id. 
 12.  Id.  
 13.  Id.   
 14.  Id. at 943.    
 15.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 7 at 7. 
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conspirators collected “consulting fees” from prospective home sellers 
under the guise that they could maximize the value of the sellers’ 
homes.16 As part of the scheme, the co-conspirators arranged for 
“straw buyers” to purchase the homes by obtaining loans from 
lenders based on false loan applications.17 The co-conspirators 
recruited Robers as a straw buyer for two homes in Walworth County, 
Wisconsin.18 Robers materially misrepresented his “income, 
qualifications, and intent to live in the houses and repay the 
mortgages.”19 Based on these fraudulent loan applications, Robers 
secured loans and wired the money to settlement companies who 
closed the loans.20  Robers received $500.00 for each loan for his role 
in the scheme.21 
When Robers defaulted on both loans, the lenders (or their 
successors-in-interest) foreclosed on the houses, taking title to them at 
sheriff’s foreclosure sales in 2006.22 Ultimately, these lenders resold 
the properties in 2007 and 2008 for substantially less than the loan 
amounts.23 
In May 2010, the government charged Robers with conspiracy to 
commit wire fraud.24 Robers ultimately pleaded guilty.25 Based on 
information presented by the government at the sentencing hearing, 
the district court ordered Robers to pay approximately $219,000.00 in 
restitution.26 This restitution calculation consisted of the loan amounts, 
plus additional expenses incurred to maintain the collateral 
properties—approximately $491,000.00—less the net cash proceeds 
obtained from resale of the properties—approximately $272,000.00—
for a total restitution award of approximately $219,000.00.27 
 
 16.  Id.  
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. at 8–9.  
 19.  United States v. Robers, 698 F.3d 937, 940 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 470 
(Oct. 21, 2013). 
 20.  Id.  
 21.  See id.  
  22.  Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 7, at 9–10. 
 23.  See id.at 10. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  United States v. Robers, 698 F.3d 937, 940 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 470 
(Oct. 21, 2013). 
 26.  See id. at 941. Robers's co-conspirators “were also ordered to pay restitution in the 
same amounts and the restitution awards were all entered with joint and several liability.” Id.  
 27.  Id. at 940–41. Specifically, the court's restitution calculation consisted of the following: 
Robers’s original mortgage note on one property was $330,000.00, and the property sold for 
$164,000.00, resulting in a loss of $166,000.00. The successor lender for the other property 
bought the mortgage note for $159,214.91, incurred additional expenses maintaining the 
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. Statutory Language and Purpose of the MVRA 
The MVRA requires defendants convicted of certain fraud crimes 
(such as the one committed by Robers) to make full restitution to 
their victims.28 In the event of a crime that deprives a victim of 
property, the statute further requires the defendant to return the 
property to the victim, unless the return is “impossible, impracticable, 
or inadequate.”29 When the return is not possible, the defendant must 
pay to the victim an amount equal to the value of the property but is 
given credit for “the value (as of the date the property is returned) of 
any part of the property that is returned.”30 
The statute’s “primary and overarching” purpose is “to 
compensate victims for their losses” and make them whole again.31 To 
this end, the MVRA provides in relevant part that a court shall order 
repayment to each victim restitution in the full amount of the victim’s 
losses as determined by the court without consideration of the 
financial circumstances of the defendant.32 Additionally, the court 
cannot take into account any compensation received by the victim 
from any source in determining the restitution amount.33 
But the MVRA is not meant to provide windfalls.34 While the 
MVRA requires that courts calculate restitution awards to include 
 
property in the amount of $1,646.20, and recovered net proceeds after the resale of the property 
in the amount of $107,908.93, resulting in an overall loss of $52,952.18. Hence, the court ordered 
Robers to pay a total restitution amount of $218,952.18, consisting of the $166,000.00 and 
$52,952.18 losses. Id.  
 28.  See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3663A(a)(1), (c)(1)(A)(ii); § 3664(f)(1)(A) (West 2014).  
 29.  § 3663A(b)(1)(B). 
 30.  § 3663A(b)(1)(B)(ii) (emphasis added). 
 31.  See, e.g., United States v. Robers, 698 F.3d 937, 943 (7th Cir. 2012) (internal citations 
omitted), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 470 (Oct. 21, 2013); see also Dolan v. United States, 560 U.S. 
605, 612 (2010) (stating that the MVRA’s purpose is “to assure that victims of a crime receive 
full restitution”); United States v. Simmonds, 235 F.3d 826, 831 (3d Cir. 2000) (describing the 
MVRA as having “the primary and overarching goal . . . to make victims of crime whole, to fully 
compensate these victims for their losses and to restore these victims to their original state of 
well-being”).    
 32.  See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3664(f)(1)(A) (West 2014) (emphasis added). 
 33.  See § 3664(f)(1)(B). 
 34.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 7 at 38; Robers, 698 F.3d at 944 (explaining that “[t]he 
MVRA ensure[s] that victims recover the full amount of their losses, but nothing more”) 
(quoting United States v. Newman, 144 F.3d 531, 542 (7th Cir. 1998)); see also United States v. 
Smith, 156 F.3d 1046, 1057 (10th Cir. 1998) (“A district court may not order restitution in an 
amount that exceeds the loss caused by the defendant's conduct. Such a restitution order would 
amount to an illegal sentence.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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the full amount of the victims’ losses,35 the statute also requires the 
courts to reduce the restitution awards by the value of any property 
(or any part of the property) the defendant returns.36 Consequently, 
under the MVRA, while courts must fully compensate victims for 
their losses, they cannot over-compensate them.37 
B.  Circuit Split on What Constitutes the Property Returned under § 
3663A(b)(1)(B)(ii) of the MVRA for Purposes of Reducing the 
Restitution Award 
The federal circuit courts are split on what constitutes “the 
property returned” under § 3663A(b)(1)(B)(ii) of the MVRA for 
purposes of calculating the offset value or reduction in the restitution 
award.38 The Ninth, Fifth, and Second Circuits have held that the 
offset value of the property returned is based on the estimated fair 
market value of the collateral on the date of foreclosure39—treating 
the collateral as the returned property.  However, the Third, Eighth, 
and Tenth Circuits have concluded that the offset value of the 
property returned is based on the cash proceeds recouped upon resale 
of the collateral40—treating the cash as the returned property. 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Smith41 exemplifies 
the use of the “collateral as returned property” rule. In Smith, the 
victim lent money to the defendant based on the defendant’s fraud.42 
When the defendant defaulted, the lender foreclosed on the collateral 
real estate.43 The defendant asserted that the district court erred in not 
giving him credit for the value of the property at the time the victim 
lender took possession of it at the foreclosure sale.44 
The Ninth Circuit agreed,45 holding that a restitution order must 
reduce the victim’s loss by the “value (as of the date the property is 
returned) of any part of the property that is returned.”46 The court 
 
 35.  See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3663A (West 2014); 18 U.S.C.A. § 3664(f)(1)(A).  
 36.  See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 3663A(b)(1)(B)(ii). 
 37.  See United States v. Robers, 698 F.3d 937, 946 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 
470 (Oct. 21, 2013).  
 38.  See id.  
 39.  Id.  
 40.  Id. at 951.  
 41.  944 F.2d 618 (9th Cir. 1991).   
 42.  Id. at 620. 
 43.  Smith, 944 F.2d at 620–21.  
 44.  Id. at 625.  
 45.  Id.  
 46.  Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3663(b)(1)(B) (1988)). 
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based its decision on its previous holding47 in United States v. Tyler.48 In 
Tyler, the defendant pleaded guilty to theft of timber and was ordered 
to pay restitution.49 Because the timber was recovered on the same 
day as the theft, the Ninth Circuit concluded that “[a]ny reduction in 
[the timber’s] value stems from the government’s decision to hold the 
timber during a period of declining prices, not from Tyler’s criminal 
acts.”50 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit held that the value of the property 
“as of the date the property was returned” equaled the amount lost 
when the timber was stolen.51 And, consequently, the measure of 
restitution under 18 U.S.C. § 3579(b)(1)(B), the predecessor to § 
3663(b)(1)(B) of the MVRA, was zero, and no restitution was owed.52 
But Tyler is distinguishable from Smith because in Tyler the 
property returned was the same as the property stolen, i.e., the timber, 
whereas in Smith, the property fraudulently obtained was cash and 
the property returned was real estate. Despite this key distinction, 
however, the Ninth, Fifth, and Second Circuits, applying Smith, have 
all endorsed the collateral as returned property rule.53 
On the other hand, the Third, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have all 
held that the restitution obligation offset value should be based on 
the cash as returned property rule.54 For example, in United States v. 
James55 the defendant pleaded guilty to wire fraud for involvement in 
a scheme to purchase homes by obtaining fraudulent mortgage 
loans.56 When the defendant failed to pay the loans, the property 
securing the loans was foreclosed upon, and the mortgage holders 
 
 47.  See id. at 625. 
 48.  767 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir. 1985).   
 49.  Id. at 1351.  
 50.  Id. at 1352.  
 51.  Id. at 1352–53.  
 52.  See id.  
 53.  See United States v. Robers, 698 F.3d 937, 949–50 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 134 S. 
Ct. 470 (Oct. 21, 2013).  
 54.  See United States v. Himler, 355 F.3d 735, 745 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that the district 
court did not abuse its discretion in entering a restitution order that would be reduced by the 
future proceeds from the real estate’s sale); United States v. James, 564 F.3d 1237, 1246–47 
(10th Cir. 2009) (upholding the district court’s restitution order that calculated the total loss by 
subtracting the eventual resale price of the collateral real estate from the initial loan proceeds); 
United States v. Statman, 604 F.3d 529, 538 (8th Cir. 2010) (upholding the district court’s use of 
the eventual proceeds from a foreclosure sale as the offset value); Robers, 698 F.3d at 951–53 
(discussing the Third, Eighth, and Tenth Circuit property restitution cases and explaining that 
they all concluded the offset value is determined based on the eventual cash proceeds recouped 
following resale of the property). 
 55.  564 F.3d 1237 (10th Cir. 2009).   
 56.  Id. at 1239–40.  
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suffered a financial loss.57 The district court reduced the defendant’s 
restitution judgment, but only by the eventual resale price of the 
collateral real estate.58 
In upholding the award, the Tenth Circuit noted that, under the 
MVRA, how to value the property returned is not specified.59 Rather, 
sentencing courts can utilize discretion in valuing the property as 
appropriate in a given case.60 The court noted that the MVRA 
demonstrates this by providing, in relevant part, a “court shall order 
restitution . . . in the full amount of each victim’s losses as determined 
by the court.”61 Importantly, the court further pointed out that the 
approach used to best measure the value of the property returned 
should reflect the purpose of restitution, which is to “ensure that 
victims, to the greatest extent possible, are made whole for their 
losses.”62 Relying on the purpose of restitution, the court held that the 
cash as returned property is the appropriate manner for determining 
the mortgage holder’s actual loss.63 
Similarly, in United States v. Statman,64 the Eighth Circuit upheld 
the cash as returned property rule.65 The court emphasized that “[t]he 
intended beneficiaries of the MVRA[] . . . are the victims, not the 
victimizers.”66 Therefore, the court held that net proceeds recouped 
after resale of the property “provided a fair and adequate 
representation of the [mortgage holder’s] loss and satisfied the 
overarching goal of the MVRA, to make [the victim] whole.”67 The 
key distinguishing factor in the split is whether the circuit courts 
chose to rely on the sentencing courts’ discretion in determining that 
the best method for calculating the offset value, taking into account 
the legislative purpose behind the MVRA, is the cash as returned 
property rule. 
 
 
 57.  Id.  
 58.  Id. at 1242.  
 59.  Id. at 1245.  
 60.  Id. at 1245 (citations omitted).  
 61.  Id.   
 62.  Id. at 1246 (quoting United States v. Parker, 553 F.3d 1309, 1323 (10th Cir. 2009)).  
 63.  Id. at 1246. 
 64.  604 F.3d 529 (8th Cir. 2010).  
 65.  Id. at 537–38.  
 66.  Id. at 538 (quoting United States v. Gordon, 393 F.3d 1044, 1053 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(internal quotation omitted)).  
 67.  Id.   
BENNETT 5 17 2014 V 1 FINAL READ (DO NOT DELETE) 5/19/2014  2:41 PM 
2013] WHAT’S MONEY GOT TO DO WITH IT? 207 
IV. HOLDING 
On appeal, Robers argued that the offset value for the restitution 
award should not be based on the cash as returned property rule.68 
Rather, the statute’s plain language allows the court to reduce 
restitution by the value of the collateral real estate as of the 
foreclosure date; the foreclosure date value is the value “as of the 
date the property is returned,” which complies with the statutory 
language.69 Robers further argued that by not using the property 
values on the actual foreclosure dates, the court wrongly held him 
responsible for the decline in the properties’ values from the time of 
foreclosure to the time of resale; the restitution award was too high.70 
Contrastingly, the government finds the plain language of the 
MVRA supports a restitution award that can only be reduced by the 
cash value of the collateral received at resale because cash—in the 
form of loan money— is the property that was taken, and cash is only 
returned at resale.71 Robers’s appeal to the Seventh Circuit challenged 
only the calculation of the restitution award.72 
The Seventh Circuit in Robers followed the Third, Eighth, and 
Tenth Circuits holding “the offset value is the eventual cash proceeds 
recouped [when the property is resold] following a foreclosure sale.”73 
The Seventh Circuit based its decision on the plain meaning of the 
MVRA.74 The MVRA states that the defendant should be given an 
offset for “the value (as of the date the property is returned) of any 
part of the property that is returned.”75 Thus, the court reasoned that 
“the property,” for purposes of determining offset value, must mean 
“the property stolen,” and the property originally stolen was cash.76 
Therefore “[s]ome amount of cash is the only way part of the property 
 
 68.  United States v. Robers, 698 F.3d 937, 942 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 470 
(Oct. 21, 2013).  
 69.  Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(b)(1)(B) (2006)).  
 70.  See id.  
 71.  Id.  
 72.  Id. at 941. Although at the district court level Robers argued that his minor role in the 
offense and his limited economic circumstances should reduce the restitution amount, he did not 
make those arguments on appeal. Id. at 941 n.3. As part of his challenge on appeal to the 
restitution amount, however, he did contend that the inclusion of certain consequential or 
incidental expenses are not recoverable under the MVRA. Id. at 941.  
 73.  Id. at 939. 
 74.  Id.   
 75.  18 U.S.C.A. § 3663A(b)(1)(B)(ii) (West 2014).   
 76.  Robers, 698 F.3d at 939.  
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can be returned.”77 
The court explained that cash and real estate are not the same; 
cash is liquid and real estate is not.78 “The victim-lender was 
defrauded out of cash and wants cash back; the victim does not want 
the houses and they do not, in any way, benefit from possessing title to 
the houses until they are converted into cash upon resale”79—one 
cannot be given for the other. 
The court concluded that its holding is consistent with both the 
goals of the MVRA and the general concept of restitution: “to fully 
compensate these victims for their losses and to restore these victims 
to their original state of well-being.”80 If the offset amount was not 
based on the eventual cash proceeds, the victims might not be made 
whole.81 The eventual sales proceeds could be, as in this case, 
“woefully inadequate to fully compensate the victims for their loss 
and to put them in the position they would have been absent the 
fraud.”82 
Though acknowledging that its conclusion conflicts with the Ninth, 
Fifth, and Second Circuits, the court noted that no pertinent case from 
those circuits  independently addressed the specific question of what 
constitutes “the property” under § 3663A(b)(1).83 The prior court 
decisions had all relied on Smith, which in turn improperly relied on 
Tyler; Tyler addressed the theft of government owned timber—there 
was no question of “what” the property returned was. The Smith case 
did not address the same type of property at issue in Tyler, and 
therefore reliance was improper. The Seventh Circuit determined that 
the Ninth, Fifth, and Second Circuit decisions were based on an 
improper treatment of the statute.84 
 
 
 77.  Id.  
 78.  Id. at 942. 
 79.  Id.  
 80.  Id. at 943 (quoting United States v. Boccagna, 450 F.3d 107, 115 (2d Cir. 2006)). 
 81.  Id.   
 82.  Id.  
 83.  Id. at 946.   
 84.  Id.  
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V. ARGUMENTS 
A.  Robers’s Arguments 
Robers first argues that the plain text and structure of the MVRA 
require that he receives an offset for the collateral real estate’s value 
when the lender takes title.85 Further, Robers contends that use of the 
word “returned” in the offset provision permits a defendant to give 
substitute property.86 If Congress had not intended such, it “could 
have used a more specific phrase such as the property reclaimed by 
the victim, but did not.”87 Robers asserts that “[t]he word ‘return’ has 
a broad reach. . . . ‘[R]eturn’ means ‘to repay or pay back in some 
similar way, esp[ecially] with something similar.’”88 
According to Robers, under the structure of § 3663A(b)(1), a 
defendant is required to return the property originally taken from the 
victim.89 However, § 3663A(b)(1)(B), containing the offset provision, 
applies when the return of the property originally lost is “impossible, 
impracticable, or inadequate;”90 therefore, Congress intended for this 
provision to cover cases in which substitute property has been 
returned.91 “If ‘property’ in that provision referred only to the 
property originally lost . . . then the offset provision would apply only 
in rare cases”; Congress did not intend for this provision to be so 
narrowly applied.92 
Section 3664, the procedural provision covering the issuance and 
enforcement of restitution orders under the MVRA, also supports a 
broader reading of § 3663A(b)(1)(B). Section 3664 permits 
“replacement property” to be an acceptable “in-kind” return of 
property.93 Specifically, Robers states that “[s]ection 3664(f)(3)(A) 
provides that a restitution order may require ‘a single, lump-sum 
payment, partial payments at specified intervals, in-kind payments, or 
a combination of’ types of payments.”94 Additionally, § 3664(f)(4) 
permits an in-kind payment to be in the form of either the “return of 
 
 85.  Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 7, at 14.    
 86.  Id.  
 87.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 88.  Id. at 18 (citation omitted). 
 89.  See id. at 22. 
 90.  Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(b)(1)(B)(ii) (2006)). 
 91.  Id. at 21–22. 
 92.  Id. at 23. 
 93.  Id. at 25.  
 94.  Id. at 26 (quoting § 3664(f)(3)(A) (2006)). 
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property” or  “replacement of property” or, if the victim consents, the 
performance of services.95 This demonstrates Congress’s intent to give 
defendants latitude in the type or form of property returned to the 
victim by not requiring them to return the exact property.96  
Moreover, Robers argues that the allowance of replacement property 
under § 3664 indicates Congress’s intent to provide judges flexibility 
in tailoring restitution orders.97 Permitting replacement property 
under the offset provision in § 3663A(b)(1)(B) furthers this goal. 
A narrow reading of the offset provision should be avoided 
because reading the provision more broadly to include replacement 
property eliminates the possibility of the defendant paying for losses 
he did not proximately cause.98 The MVRA, as well as fundamental 
principles of criminal and tort law, provide that a defendant is 
responsible only for losses “directly and proximately caused by the 
course of [his] conduct.”99 A narrow reading of the offset provision 
would allow for a reduction in the restitution award only by the 
houses’ values at resale rather than at foreclosure, meaning “the 
defendant must pay for any decline in the houses’ values between the 
time the lenders foreclose and the time the lenders resell.”100 Yet, as 
Robers contends, “a defendant’s false loan application is rarely the 
‘direct,’ ‘unbroken’ cause of those losses.”101 Instead, such decline in 
values result from “[o]ther ‘independent,’ ‘intervening’ causes.”102 If 
the houses drop in value, it is due to a market decline that is largely 
“unforeseeable” and thus a “‘superseding’ cause of the losses.”103  
Alternatively, Robers claims that the lenders themselves are 
responsible for the losses in market values of the houses since the 
lenders controlled how promptly to sell the houses after the 
foreclosure sales.104 Thus, even if Robers’s fraud was a cause of the 
losses, it was certainly not the proximate cause.105 
Additionally, Robers argues that the Seventh Circuit’s narrow 
reading of the offset provision negates well-established tenets of state 
 
 95.  Id.  
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Id. at 27.  
 98.  Id. at 28.  
 99.  Id. (citation omitted). 
 100.  Id. at 29. 
 101.  Id.  
 102.  Id.  
 103.  Id.  
 104.  Id. at 29–30.  
 105.  Id. at 30.  
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mortgage and foreclosure laws.106 The mortgage and foreclosure “law 
dictates that when a lender forecloses and takes title to the property, 
foreclosure law values the property as of the date the lender takes 
title, not as of the date the property is sold.”107 When the lender waives 
its right to a deficiency judgment, as Robers’s lenders did, the lenders 
have accepted “the real estate collateral as a replacement for the loan 
proceeds.”108 “Taking title to the property is thus a common means of 
getting a ‘return’ of the loan proceeds.”109 Thus, the Seventh Circuit’s 
ruling that the offset value must be the cash recouped from the 
property’s resale, and that cash is what the lender actually wants, 
“turns the concept of collateral on its head.”110 Robers urges that, “[a]s 
this case demonstrates, lenders often want nothing but the 
collateral—and contractually bind themselves to seek only the 
collateral.”111 Therefore, the Court should not presume Congress 
intended “to establish a regime at complete odds with the common 
and state law practices of awarding compensatory damages in such 
situations.”112 
Rober’s argues that the Seventh Circuit’s ruling undermines the 
statutory purpose of the MVRA.113 Specifically, because “[t]he 
MVRA’s purpose is to make victims whole without granting them 
windfalls,”114 the Seventh Circuit’s ruling creates the dual risk of both 
under-compensating and over-compensating victims.115 Robers 
explains that in some cases victims would not have resold the 
collateral houses before the sentencing of the defendant.116 In those 
instances, the court has two choices: (1) refuse to order restitution, 
which does not compensate the victim at all; or (2) “order restitution 
for the full outstanding loan amount,”117 which will give the victim a 
 
 106.  Id.  
 107.  Id. at 32.    
 108.  Id. “[B]oth lenders in this case, like many other foreclosing lenders, elected to waive 
their rights to a deficiency judgment. This meant that the lenders accepted the collateral as full 
satisfaction of their claims: they could not receive, and did not expect to receive, any further 
recovery against Mr. Robers beyond the foreclosed houses.” Id. at 34.   
 109.  Id. at 33.  
 110.  Id. at 33–34.  
 111.  Id. at 34. 
 112.  Id.   
 113.  Id. at 38.  
 114.  Id.  (citing United States v. Louper-Morris, 672 F.3d 539, 566 (8th Cir. 2012).  
 115.  Id. at 39.  
 116.  Id.  
 117.  Id. 
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windfall if he later sells the house.118 
B.  Government’s Arguments 
Addressing first the plain text meaning of the MVRA, the 
government argues that when a crime covered under the MVRA 
results in a victim’s loss of property, the MVRA requires the 
defendant to return the lost property to the victim.119 If the return of 
the lost property in full is not possible, however, the MVRA requires 
the defendant to pay for the value of the lost property and allows an 
offset for the value of “any part of the property” that is returned to 
the victim.120 Here, the victims lost money, and no “part of the 
property” that was lost was returned to them until they recouped 
money from selling the collateral.121 Further, § 3663A(b)(1) addresses 
the treatment of property lost by a victim, and every reference to “the 
property,” including  § 3663A(b)(1)(B)(ii)’s reference to “any part of 
the property that is returned,” is a reference to the property that was 
lost, not to any substitute or replacement property.122 
According to the government, Robers errs in interpreting the 
statutory text, and further, the structure of the statute lends no 
support to his interpretation. Read in context, the reference in § 
3663A(b)(1) to property that is “returned” plainly references the 
property that was lost because of the defendant’s criminal conduct.123 
Additionally, the government argues this meaning is consistent 
with § 3663A(b)(1)(B)’s structure and application to instances in 
which the return of the lost property is “impossible, impractical, or 
inadequate.”124 Section  3663A(b)(1)(B)(i) addresses scenarios in 
which none of the property can be returned, and  § 
3663A(b)(1)(B)(ii) addresses scenarios in which some, but not all, of 
 
 118.  Id. Robers contends as well that the rule of lenity should be applied here if the Court 
does not agree that the text and structure of the offset provision plainly requires offsets to 
restitution for the return of collateral. Id. at 40. Robers argues that almost every defendant who 
makes an in-kind return of collateral or other property would obtain a lower offset value under 
the Seventh Circuit's ruling. Id at 41. Moreover, even if the returned property is converted into 
cash, Robers asserts that the value would depend on conditions beyond the defendant’s control, 
such as market status and the victim’s investment decisions, and the rule of lenity was designed 
to avoid exactly such uncertain and unforeseeable punishments. Id. 
 119.  See Brief for the United States at 13, Robers v. United States, No. 12-9012 (U.S. June 
3, 2013).  
 120.  Id. at 13–14.  
 121.  Id. at 16. 
 122.  Id. at 14.    
 123.  Id. at 18. 
 124.  Id. at 20–21.  
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the lost property can be returned or in which the return of the 
original property is inadequate to compensate the victim for some 
reason, such as when the property is damaged.125 Nevertheless, the 
government argues that throughout both subparagraphs, “the 
property” referred to is always the property that was lost.126 
In support of its reading of the plain meaning of § 
3663A(b)(1)(B), the government argues that this interpretation is 
consistent with the overall structure of the MVRA.127 For example, § 
3663A governs the substantive calculation of the restitution amount, 
while § 3664 governs the procedures and enforcement of the 
restitution obligation;128 as such, different considerations are properly 
taken into account under each of these sections of the statute.129 
Although a court may order, pursuant to § 3664, that a defendant 
satisfy his restitution obligation with substitute property, a court may 
not grant an offset for substitute property when calculating the 
restitution amount owed under § 3663A.130 
Additionally, the government asserts that its interpretation of § 
3663A promotes the MVRA’s purpose of ensuring that the victim is 
fully compensated or restored.131 A victim fraudulently deprived of 
money, as here, is not fully compensated or restored to her original 
state until she gets that money back.132 A victim of mortgage fraud has 
every incentive to maximize the money she receives from foreclosed 
real estate. The government notes that “[b]ecause most defendants 
lack significant financial resources with which to promptly pay a 
restitution award,” a victim has no assurance that she will otherwise 
recover the money.133  Moreover, if the foreclosed real estate sells for 
a gain, that gain will inure to the benefit of both the victim and the 
defendant in the form of a higher offset.134 Under Robers’s view—that 
the ultimate sales price cannot be credited against the restitution 
obligation—”the victim must bear the full burden of any loss in value 
while the defendants will enjoy the benefit of any gain.”135 
 
 125.  Id.   
 126.  See id.  
 127.  Id. at 22. 
 128.  Id.  
 129.  See id. at 22–23.  
 130.  Id. at 23–24. 
 131.  Id. at 24.  
 132.  Id. at 24–25. 
 133.  Id. at 37.  
 134.  See id. at 28–29.  
 135.  Id.  at 11. 
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Further, the government criticizes Robers’s argument that he did 
not both directly and proximately cause the decline in the value of the 
collateral real estate between the time of foreclosure and resale. The 
government argues the chain of causation is clear and direct: but for 
Robers’s fraud, the lenders would not have loaned him the money, 
taken title to the houses upon Robers’s default, or sold the houses in a 
declining market.136 Robers’s criminal conduct directly and 
proximately caused the victims’ losses and attributed to any relevance 
that the declining market might have had on lowering the offset 
calculation.137 
The government discounts Robers’s reliance on the principles of 
mortgage and foreclosure law, asserting that the MVRA’s provisions 
apply broadly and “notwithstanding any provision of mortgage law 
that may govern the state-law rights of lenders.”138 Hence, because the 
MVRA’s provisions do not just apply to mortgage fraud, its provisions 
should not be “distorted” to accommodate mortgage law principles.139 
VI. ANALYSIS AND LIKELY DISPOSITION 
The question presented to the Supreme Court is whether a 
defendant, who has fraudulently obtained a loan and thus owes 
restitution under 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(b)(1)(B), returns “any part” of 
the loan money by giving the lenders the collateral securing the 
loan.140 The answer turns on what is meant by “the property that is 
returned” in the statute. Both Robers and the government claim to 
rely on the plain language of the MVRA; yet, they arrive at different 
conclusions as to what constitutes “the property”—conclusions that 
yield a stark difference in the amount of restitution Robers owes.141 
 
 136.  Id. at 35. 
 137.  Id. at 35–36. 
 138.  Id. at 38–39. 
 139.  Id. at 37–38. The government also asserts that the rule of lenity does not apply in this 
case because it is a tie-breaking rule that only applies if, “at the end of the process of construing 
what Congress has expressed . . . there is grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute.” Id. at 
41.  Here, the rule of lenity, argues the government, does not apply because the statutory text is 
not ambiguous at all. Id.at 42. 
 140.  Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 7, at i.  
 141.  Robers contends that the restitution award should be reduced by the houses’ higher 
values in 2006 when he “surrendered” (returned) the properties to the lenders through state 
foreclosure proceedings, rather than by the lower values in 2007 or 2008 when the lenders resold 
the houses. Id. at 12. Robers asserts if the higher values are used and his minor role in the 
offense is taken into account (in other words, the restitution obligation is apportioned), his total 
restitution amount should be $4,800.00, as opposed to the $218,952.18 calculated by the 
government. Id. 
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The Court will likely begin its analysis by examining the relevant 
statutory text of the MVRA to determine whether the meaning of the 
statute is plain. Rules of statutory construction require that 
consideration be given to whether a certain interpretation gives rise 
to a consistent meaning of a phrase throughout a statute.142 Following 
this principle, the Seventh Circuit concluded “the property” in the 
MVRA always means the stolen property—in this case, cash.143 By 
contrast, under Robers’s interpretation, “the property” refers to two 
different things within the same section of the MVRA: the original 
fraudulently-obtained loan in the first part of § 3663A(b)(1)(B); and 
the returned collateral securing the loans in the latter part of that 
section.144 Robers cannot have it both ways. The Court will likely agree 
with the Seventh Circuit that “the property” must have a consistent 
meaning within the statute, and certainly within the same section of 
the statute. In this case, the Court will most likely find that the 
property in § 3663A(b)(1) of the MVRA refers to the fraudulently-
obtained cash. 
This result stems from the simple explanation that these two types 
of property—cash and collateral—are not interchangeable. Collateral 
cannot be given to the victim-lenders in lieu of cash any more than, as 
the government argued, the victim of a stolen necklace can be given a 
stamp collection in exchange for the necklace.145 
The Court will likely also consider the overall structure of the 
MVRA in determining the meaning of the phrase “the property.” 
Robers points out that pursuant to § 3664(f) of the MVRA, a court 
can permit a defendant to satisfy a restitution obligation with in-kind 
payments, including replacement property.146 He fails to explain, 
however, that the relevant subsection of § 3664(f), allowing for the 
replacement property, relates to specifying the manner and schedule 
for paying the restitution order, not determining the amount of the 
restitution obligation.147 In § 3663A, the section actually governing 
determination of the restitution amount,148 there is no mention of 
credit for in-kind payments or replacement property relative to 
 
 142.  See United States v. Robers, 698 F.3d 937, 942–43 (7th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted).  
 143.  Id. at 942. 
 144.  Id.  
 145.  Brief for the United States, supra note 119, at 15. 
 146.  See supra notes 90–92 and accompanying text. 
 147.  See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3664(f)(2), (f)(3)(A), (f)(4)(B) (West 2014); see also supra Part V.B.   
 148.  See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3663A (West 2014); see also Brief for the United States, supra note 
119, at 22.  
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determining the amount of restitution. This is because Congress did 
not intend to allow such payments to be included in the calculation of 
defendant’s offset for purposes of reducing the restitution obligation 
amount under § 3663A.149 As the government clearly states, “[s]ection 
3663A ties the amount of restitution to the amount of loss a victim 
suffers because of a defendant’s crime. Section 3664 dictates how a 
court may ensure that a defendant actually pays the amount due 
under Section 3663A.”150 Therefore, in-kind payments, including in the 
form of replacement property, are reserved as a means of how the 
defendant may pay the restitution obligation. The only offset given for 
purposes of calculating the restitution amount is for any part of the 
property that is returned,151 and here that property is cash. 
The clear statutory purpose of the MVRA will guide the Court in 
reaching its decision. The “primary and overarching” goal of the 
MVRA is to fully compensate victims, make them whole, and return 
them to their original status, all without providing them a windfall.152 
Thus, the Court will likely construe the statutory text in a way that 
best serves the MVRA’s given purpose—that is, the Court will 
determine whether the cash as returned property rule or the collateral 
as returned property rule better serves to make the victim whole. 
Inherent in making that determination, the Court will decide 
which method of valuing property best serves to fully compensate the 
victim and return her to her original status. Various methods of 
valuing property exist, such as fair market value, assessed or appraised 
value, foreclosure credit-bid value, and value at resale following 
foreclosure (which is the cash as returned property rule).153 None of 
these methods of appraisal, however, except the value of cash 
obtained at resale after foreclosure, reflect how much the victim-
lender will receive in actual cash—the very thing loaned to 
defendants, expected to be received from defendants, and now, as a 
result of defendant’s crime, required in restitution in accordance with 
the text and purpose of the MVRA. 
 
 
 
 
 149.  Brief for the United States, supra note 119, at 23.  
 150.  Id. at 22.   
 151.  See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3663A(b)(1)(B)(ii). 
 152.  Robers, 698 F.3d at 943–44.  
 153.  Brief for the United States, supra note 119, at 25–26.  
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The fair market value, the appraised value, and the foreclosure 
credit-bid value154 cannot each serve as a determinant for the actual 
eventual cash that a victim-lender might receive when the property is 
later sold. The only way to know with certainty what value the 
property returned will actually realize in dollars to the victim-lender 
is to measure it by the eventual cash proceeds that are recouped upon 
resale of the collateral property. 
In a mortgage fraud case such as Robers, using the cash as 
returned property rule seems to best serve the purpose of the MVRA 
by making victims of crimes whole to the greatest extent possible.155 If 
values are increased and the property sells for a higher amount than is 
owed, the victim-lender would not be entitled to a restitution award. 
If values decline, then the victim-lender would be due a restitution 
award based on the difference between what was owed and what was 
actually received after resale of the property. In the infrequent 
scenario in which the collateral real estate has not resold before the 
defendant’s sentencing (statistics indicate that in most cases the 
properties sell prior to defendant’s sentencing and restitution 
order),156 the sentencing court could otherwise sentence the defendant 
but postpone the final determination of the victim’s losses until ninety 
days after the sentencing.157 If the sale has not occurred within the 
ninety days after sentencing, the Supreme Court has established 
precedent for permitting the sentencing court to go beyond the 
ninety-day timeframe to enter an order of restitution,158 provided the 
sentencing court timely and explicitly reserves the right to do so.159 
 
 154.  Fair market value is the price a willing seller and buyer agree to in the open market. 
Id.at 25. Appraised value is the value a third party assigns based on certain market variables. Id 
at 26. Foreclosure credit-bid value is the value used by a lender (against the credit amount due) 
that is typically just enough to win the bid and obtain title to the property at a foreclosure if 
there are no other bidders or if the lender deems all other bids too low. Id. 
 155.  See United States v. James, 564 F.3d 1237, 1246 (10th Cir. 2009).  
 156.  Brief for the United States, supra note 119, at 27–28; see also Elizabeth Renuart, 
Toward a More Equitable Balance: Homeowner and Purchaser Tensions in Non-Judicial 
Foreclosure States, 24 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 562, 570 n.47 (2012) (indicating that in 2006 
banks sold about 50 percent of properties bought at foreclosure within six months and close to 
80 percent within a year).  
 157.  18 U.S.C.A. § 3664(d)(5) (West 2014). 
 158.  Brief for the United States, supra note 119, at 28 (citing Dolan v. United States, 560 
U.S. 605, 611 (2010). 
 159.  Dolan, 560 U.S. at 608. Interestingly, however, Chief Justice Roberts, joined by 
Justices Stevens, Scalia, and Kennedy, wrote a strong dissent stating that, other than the express 
ninety-day exception, any order of restitution under the MVRA must be made at sentencing. Id. 
at 622 (Roberts, CJ dissenting). Remaining to be seen is whether the Court in deciding Robers 
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The Court will not likely be persuaded by Robers’s argument that 
the Seventh Circuit’s ruling does not comport with state mortgage or 
foreclosure laws since the MVRA applies much more broadly than to 
just mortgage fraud. Thus, as the government suggests, the Court 
should not give special meaning to § 3663A(b)(1)(B)(ii)’s reference to 
a return of “any part of the property” in the mortgage-fraud context 
because the meaning of the phrase should be consistent across the 
MVRA’s applications.160 Neither mortgage nor foreclosure laws 
address the meaning of the phrase, “any part of the property” in § 
3663A(b)(1)(B)(ii), further evidence that the MVRA’s provisions are 
not particular to mortgage or foreclosure laws.161  Therefore, the 
district court properly calculated Robers’s restitution amount 
irrespective of any state mortgage law or foreclosure practice that 
may govern lenders’ rights. 
Likewise, the Court will probably reject Robers’s argument that 
he did not proximately and directly cause all his victims’ losses. 
Proximate cause principles should have no impact on the offset 
calculation in § 3663A(b)(1)(B)(ii). The government convincingly 
argues Robers’s fraudulent conduct indisputably initiated the chain of 
events that directly and proximately caused the victim-lenders to lose 
the original loan amounts he borrowed from them.162 And these are 
the losses for which Robers should provide restitution. Principles of 
causation do not factor into the determination of when “any part of 
the property” that was lost is returned to a victim.163 
This conclusion is supported by United States v. Paul.164 There, the 
Second Circuit held in a securities fraud case that a decline in the 
value of collateral stock due to market forces was irrelevant to the 
restitution offset calculation since the stock was only collateral for the 
fraudulently-obtained loans.165 The court concluded that “[t]he loss to 
the brokerage houses resulted from [defendant’s] inducement of the 
loans, and it is for this loss that [defendant] must provide 
 
sees this issue as a loose end that needs to be re-visited, and, if so, how it will attempt to tie up 
such loose end. 
 160.  Brief for the United States, supra note 119, at 38. 
 161.  Id.  
 162.  Id. at 34.  
 163.  Id.  
 164.  634 F.3d 668 cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 538 (2011).   
 165.  Id. at 678. 
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restitution.”166 
Additionally, Robers’s argument that the victims’ retention of the 
collateral after foreclosure resulted in an intervening event that broke 
the causal chain will likely not hold up. There appears to be no 
support in the record indicating that the lenders could have resold the 
properties as soon as they acquired them after foreclosure.167 
Additionally, commonplace knowledge about the mortgage industry 
dispels the notion that lenders can resell foreclosed properties 
promptly after foreclosure.168 Moreover, as explained by the Seventh 
Circuit, “[t]he decline in the real estate market does not mitigate 
[Robers’s] fraud . . . . Absent Robers’s fraud, the decline in the real 
estate market would have been irrelevant . . . . The declining market 
only became an issue because of Robers’s fraud.”169 
Finally, Robers should not receive credit against his restitution 
award on the grounds that the decline in the housing market was 
unforeseeable. government“A defendant who fraudulently obtains 
loan proceeds and then depends on the foreclosure of the collateral to 
partially compensate his victims for their loss predictably (and by his 
own volition) ties the amount of restitution he will have to pay to the 
health of the housing market.”170Therefore, that the housing market 
might decline should have been a distinct, foreseeable possibility. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In sum, the statutory text, structure, and strong purpose of the 
MVRA will likely create a sufficient basis for the Supreme Court to 
uphold the Seventh Circuit’s ruling. The Court will likely determine 
that the property (or any part of it) returned, giving rise to an offset 
under § 3663A(b)(1)(B)(ii) of the MVRA, refers to the fraudulently-
obtained property—in this case, the cash. Valuing the property 
returned based on the eventual cash proceeds received at resale after 
foreclosure provides the most certainty for making the victim-lenders 
whole and thus fulfilling the purpose of the MVRA. 
The Court will likely endorse the cash as returned property rule; 
 
 166.  Brief for the United States, supra note 119, at 34 (quoting Paul, 634 U.S. at 678). 
 167.  See Brief for the United States, supra note 119, at 36. 
 168.  Id. (citations omitted) (“A bank with [real-estate-owned] inventory is faced with 
property it does not want to own, possible title, repair, lien, and tax issues that it must clear 
before it can sell, mounting maintenance costs, and other headaches.”).  
 169.  United States v. Robers, 698 F.3d 937, 943–44 (7th Cir. 2012).  
 170.  Brief for the United States, supra note 119, at 35–36. 
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however, it may also determine the need to re-address what happens 
if the property does not sell within ninety days after sentencing—the 
amount of time expressly granted to a sentencing court under the 
MVRA to delay the final determination of the victim’s losses and 
enter a restitution order.171 
 
 
 171.  See supra note 152. 
